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Introduction 
 Verification and validation of computer codes and models used in simulation are two 
aspects of the scientific practice of high importance and have recently been discussed by 
philosophers of science. While verification is predominantly associated with the correctness of the 
way a model is represented by a computer code or algorithm, validation more often refers to 
model’s relation to the real world and its intended use. It has been argued that because complex 
simulations are generally not transparent to a practitioner, the Duhem problem can arise for 
verification and validation due to their entanglement; such an entanglement makes it impossible 
to distinguish whether a coding error or model’s general inadequacy to its target should be blamed 
in the case of the model failure. I argue that in order to disentangle verification and validation, a 
clear distinction between computer modeling (construction of mathematical computer models of 
elementary processes) and simulation (construction of models of composite objects and processes 
by means of numerical experimenting with them) needs to be made.  Holding on to that distinction, 
I propose to relate verification (based on theoretical strategies such as inferences) to modeling and 
validation, which shares the common epistemology with experimentation, to simulation. To 
explain reasons of their intermittent entanglement I propose a weberian ideal-typical model of 
modeling and simulation as roles in practice. I suggest an approach to alleviate the Duhem problem 
for verification and validation generally applicable in practice and based on differences in 
epistemic strategies and scopes. 
 
Modeling and simulation 
In order to disentangle verification and validation one needs first to disentangle and explicitly 
define modeling and simulation. Among approaches to their definition one can identify two most 
frequently occurring ones in literature: those terms are either used interchangeably without 
assigning them unambiguous and explicit definitions or in a way that simulation represents a subset 
of more universal modeling practices. For example, the definition of simulation by E.Winsberg is 
manifold, he describes it both as “the kind of “theorizing” […] – the construction of local, 
representative models,” and experimenting with computer (Winsberg, 2010); he also associates 
simulation with a model itself as used in simulation. In (Keller 2003, 204) it is also argued that 
“computer simulation is … directed toward eliciting the implications of well-formulated 
theoretical models”, relating it to a more extent to theory. P. Humphreys gives computer simulation 
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a definition of numerical experimenting (which is close to one of Winsberg’s characterizations): 
“a computer simulation is any computer-implemented method for exploring the properties of 
mathematical models”; he also calls simulation a computational device producing solutions to the 
model (Humphreys, 1991). S.Peck argues that “simulation can be viewed as another kind of 
experimental system” (Peck, 2004, 530). M.Morrison (Morrison, 2009, 55) also relates simulation 
to numerical experimentation and contends that “computer plus simulation programme functions 
as apparatus”. Some accounts even characterize computer simulations as “material experiments in 
a straightforward sense” (Parker, 2009, 495) because they are performed on a digital computer 
(which is a material system) while others argue that the physicality of processes in a computer 
does not explain why simulations generate new data (Barberousse, 2009, 573).  
There is also an ambiguity in definitions of modeling. For example, (Morrison, 2009, 47) claims 
that “the computational resources of simulation […] make[] it different from modelling” and 
ascribes simulation to “a type of “enhanced” modelling”. M.Weisberg delineates modeling as “the 
indirect study of real-world systems via the construction and analysis of models” (Weisberg, 
2013). Here modeling stands not only for building models but also for their analysis, which can 
also be understood as exploring their properties. In the former case it has much in common with 
the way Winsberg defines simulation, and in the latter – how both Winsberg and Humphreys 
characterize simulation in the sense of numerical experimentation. This latter interpretation is also 
supported by Weisberg’s description of simulation as “computing the behaviour of the model using 
a particular set of initial conditions” (Weisberg, 2013). 
One of the first and most cited denotations of simulation (not necessary computational) was given 
by S.Hartmann, who wrote that “a simulation imitates one process by another process” (Hartmann, 
1996). While this definition apparently encompasses both modeling and simulation as described 
by the aforementioned authors, one can clearly envision that in order to accomplish such a 
simulation it is necessary to both construct the imitating process (or a code (a computer-
implemented algorithm) in the case of computer simulation) and explore its behavior (run the 
computer code with a particular set of input parameters or perform many runs with parameters 
covering all the parameter space of the problem) ((Winsberg, 2014) also describes simulation as 
one run of a computer code). Even if we look into the construction of a computational code of the 
imitating process we can clearly discriminate between elementary processes (like interaction of a 
particle with a nucleus) and composite processes (heat release in an irradiated water tank, radiation 
propagation and attenuation in matter) that are constructed by embedding low-level and more 
universal elementary ones into a more general framework. 
For instance, in particle physics, a model of particle interaction with another particle or a 
nucleus is more elementary than that of its interaction with a block of material, where the particle 
encounters sometimes hundreds of other particles and takes part in a multitude of interactions of 
different kinds. The reason of this relative simplicity is that an elementary process model and 
occurs at another scale of system organization or different (lower) level of it. Building higher-level 
structural models can be recognized as a separate kind of activity and expertise (epistemic scope) 
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from both running simulation code and elementary process model building; however, from the 
point of view of scientific practice, those practitioners who run simulations can also either build 
structural models or adjust existing ones to their needs as their different role. This allows to 
consider modelers and simulationists as ideal types in the weberian sense as will be described 
below. That is one of the reasons I shall discuss the higher-level structural model construction as 
a part of simulations. 
One possible way to support the necessary distinction is to consider the epistemic scope of a 
practitioner in the field. Counterintuitively, an increase in the level of model organization does not 
always entail a respective increase in complexity and scope of required knowledge but changes 
the scope of that knowledge; such an increase usually implies alterations of the scope. A process 
modeler, who is supposed to build his or her models from the very basic principles, needs to be 
familiar and able to apply all mathematical structures pertinent to models he or she builds down to 
the level of the most elementary processes and basic laws. On the contrary, simulationists who are 
not process modelers and thus build and apply higher-level models of composite objects often are 
not required to have an extensive acquaintance with the basic structures of models that the 
underlying elementary processes are based upon; their concern is that the models they use be well 
verified by the modelers who create them1. Elementary models are usually provided to them in the 
form of ready-to-use computational procedure units suitable for incorporating them into more 
complex composite models. Therefore, simulationists have to envision the structure and 
macroscopic designs of the complex system they intend to construct. Simulationists also have a 
general understanding how the relevant model parameters affect behavior of the modeled system 
and explore influence of those parameters.  
Thus, there exists an apparent controversy in the discussed above definitions of modeling and 
simulation leaving room for a more rigorous characterizations of both domains capable of 
answering the question whether simulation is construction of a model, computing its behavior or 
both (the entire computational study of a particular system). I argue that such controversy can 
nevertheless be resolved provided one considers differences in both aspects of the practices 
(construction of elementary models, construction of composite models, their explorations) and 
epistemic scopes of corresponding practitioners (knowledge how to construct elementary process 
model on the one hand and knowledge how to construct a real-world target model based on a set 
of pre-built embedded elementary models and numerical experimentation). This latter construction 
of a “real-world” higher-level target model can comprise carrying out many individual runs of a 
simulation code supplying it with different sets of input parameters. Based on the discussion above 
I propose to resolve the controversy by defining modeling as creation of computational 
mathematical models of elementary objects and processes and simulation as creation of composite 
computational models (those embedding elementary ones) by numerical experimentation. 
                                                          
1 Much alike the use of a TV set or a phone does not require the knowledge of its internal organization. 
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A study of magnet placement in experiments with the Tevatron accelerator can serve an example 
of the distinction. In order to describe and study propagation of protons in a complex magnetic 
fields of the accelerator (including second-order effects such as so-called fringe fields) one needs 
to ascribe magnetic fields to individual magnets, dipoles, quadruples etc. which altogether 
constitute the entire magnetic system of the accelerator and create its magnetic optics. The magnets 
are characterized by shapes, sizes, relative arrangements and altogether represent the organization 
of accelerator’s technical real-world in its highest-order scale (I do not discuss here the social 
dimension). Construction and study of the accelerator’s computational model can thus be regarded 
as simulation. In the course of such simulation (model creation and particle propagation numerical 
study) practitioners usually run computer models a multitude of times supplying it with various 
sets of parameters covering all the parameter space under scrutiny in order to meet an optimal 
regime. As I shall discuss in the next paragraphs, such simulation is grounded in strategies which 
possess many features of experimental practice rather than theoretical and such an ascription of 
experimental strategies to simulation rather than modeling constitutes an essential part of my 
further argument. However, construction of a composite accelerator model relies in turn on 
incorporated in it elementary models of magnetic field creation by charged particles that are 
governed by Maxwellian equations. Maxwellian low is the lowest, the most elementary level of 
the accelerator system organization and its computational implementation serves a building block 
of the higher-level simulation model of the entire accelerator. On the other hand, a representation 
and solution of Maxwellian equations are analytical and constitutes an inference pertinent to 
theoretical strategies. Therefore, development of computational procedures calculating solutions 
of equations of electrodynamics for an arbitrary set of initial conditions is deemed as modeling for 
the purpose of my argument. 
 
Applicability of the epistemology of experimentation 
 
Based on the distinction made above between simulation and modeling an ascription of 
experimental strategies (Franklin 2012) to simulation rather than modeling in the aforementioned 
sense can be made. Simulationists as higher-level model designers often use common sense 
considerations to verify that their results are consistent; however, more often they “benchmark” 
their results (or outputs) against experimental or observational “real-world” data as well as other 
simulation methods (computer codes). For example, a complex magnetic field produced by a 
complex accelerator structure can sometimes be also measured experimentally and compared to a 
simulation output. Nevertheless, matching their outputs to analytical solutions is not generally 
available to them due to both complexity and opacity (Humphreys, 2004) of the systems they 
simulate and difference in their epistemic scope with modelers. It is, however, possible for 
modelers, who create models of elementary processes, for instance, to obtain an analytical solution 
of a lower-level problem of electrodynamics for a simplest magnetic structure and then verify how 
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its computational representation is programmed; for such models either other computational 
models or analytical solutions usually exist to compare to.  
Another method frequently used to increase confidence that apparatus works properly is to vary 
one of the parameters of the system under scrutiny, for instance, adding ink to a sample and 
observing the predicted color change in a microscope. (Winsberg, 2010) discusses that 
simulationists also vary parameters of the model and check whether the system responds in 
accordance with their expectations. However, by virtue of the distinction between the two scales 
(modeling and simulation ones) one can see that such approach is possible only for simulationists 
working with high-level models of composite objects and processes, and in this respect it is similar 
to the conventional experimentation. For instance, a simulationist can vary distances between 
individual dipole and quadruple magnets in an accelerator arrangement to see the response, for 
example, whether the agreement with the measured field strength becomes better or worse (I shall 
refer to this example when discussing validation experiments). One more such example is varying 
density or material composition in a model sample irradiated by certain particles and matching 
simulated energy release to that measured in a calorimetric experiment. On the other hand, models 
of elementary processes (eventually leading to a heat production) are verified by modelers like 
theories in a way different than object ones, i.e. parameter variations cannot suffice to argue for 
their validity. Again, the latter strategy is conceivable for elementary (low-level) process modeling 
at the stage of its computer implementation in order to verify if the model is suitably coded. That 
stage, nevertheless, cannot be referred to as the simulation (high-level) model construction itself. 
Here, simulation is considered not only as “enhanced modelling” but also a domain of different 
scale and scope than the computer modeling. 
 
One more Franklin’s experimental epistemic strategy (Winsberg 2010, 44) finds similar to that 
used in simulations is measuring the same observable with a different kind of apparatus; in 
simulations that strategy correlates with simulating the same system using two or more different 
models. According to the distinction between simulation and modeling, such a strategy cannot be 
applied to modeling of elementary processes and elaborating such models as another instrumental 
theoretical model in order to be as valid as the previous one is supposed to reproduce the same set 
of empirical data as the first one and not necessarily its predictions outside the relevant data range. 
Rather than modeling, parameters of higher-level models in simulation are varied exactly in the 
way as it is done in experimentation, assuming different models to be different “apparatuses”. The 
same accelerator can be simulated by independent simulation codes, for example, MAD and 
Synergia, which exploit completely different high-level concepts and assumptions (and can be 
associated with two different apparatuses in experimentation). Nevertheless, all codes used in the 
field reveal identical understanding of the low-level Maxwellian electrodynamics, which belongs 
to the scope of elementary process modeling. 
 In the case of different models of the same “real-world” object, for instance, accelerator 
(or thunderstorm) different codes supplied with sets of input parameters (“lattices”) are different 
representations of the same “real-world” object; however, they refer to different model objects – 
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sets of structural models implemented based on different assumptions. The correspondence 
between these different models and the “real-world” one is not obvious as the simulations models 
can employ various abstractions and idealizations (Humphreys, 2004) and, more importantly, 
models of processes may contain many different fictitious assumptions (like the artificial viscosity 
model (Winsberg, 2010, 14)) or even be in a contradiction with experience and underlying physical 
laws (like the Arakawa operator (Lenhard, 2007)). From this point of view, an important way to 
increase confidence in simulation results is to investigate models based on as different as possible 
or at least independent model representations of the process under scrutiny, as being different 
approaches to description of the same reference process by an imitating one, neither of the models 
can be thought of as per se more relevant. That is why the experimental strategy of comparing 
simulations employing different higher-level model representations and different sets of 
incorporated low-level models of processes is imperative to increase reliability of simulation 
results. 
 
Modeler and simulationist as ideal types 
 
Despite due to substantial differences in epistemic scope and strategies as well as their relation to 
different organizational scales, simulation and modeling are evidently distinct they are often 
interwoven in the scientific practice. That implies that individual practitioners are often engaged 
in both kinds of activities. In order to represent this, the weberian theory of ideal types (Weber, 
1949, 49) can be involved. Let us assume simulationist and modeler to be two ideal types whose 
differences on epistemic and ontological grounds are extensively discussed throughout this paper. 
One more important ideal type is an IT expert, whose expertise comprises computer programming 
and competent operation. Virtually, a practitioner can belong solely to any of these ideal types, 
however, more often his or her function encompasses all the three domains in one way or another. 
 
Figure 1. Triangle of ideal types in the simulation practice (vertices of the triangle) and the 
expertise of an actual practitioner (the dot inside the triangle). 
 
IT expert 
Simulationist Process modeler 
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There is, therefore, one more significant similarity between experiments and simulations, 
which results from the distinction discussed above. Experimentation requires a detailed knowledge 
of the instrumental and technical theories on which the functioning of apparatus is based for the 
sake of interpretation of data in terms of high-level theories. However, being encoded in 
computational procedures elementary process models can serve examples of procedural 
knowledge; they do not represent knowledge why something is to be calculated in a particular way 
(or proofs and inferences pertinent to theory), but rather a recipe how one can calculate a quantity, 
i.e. an instruction how to obtain an answer to a particular question by means of either applying it 
computationally or supplying it as a set of input instructions to a computer code. 
 These procedural models are circulated between modelers and simulationists, and 
therefore, simulationists in order to investigate a model in simulations need, on the one hand, to 
choose models of processes, and construe out of them composite models (simulations) of a “real-
world” object whose properties they intend to explore. Thus, the epistemic scope of simulation of 
a thunderstorm does not necessary encompass interactions of individual molecules in a cloud, or 
knowledge required to simulate interactions of a particle within a chunk of material does not 
necessarily encompass that of interactions of individual particles with individual nuclei, provided 
simulationists possess necessary elementary models as pre-existing elaborated computational 
procedures. This explains why a simulationist can successfully practice higher-level simulations 
despite being “ignorant of aspects of how [lower-level procedure] was programmed or how it 
works” (Parke, 2014). 
Once we distinguish modelers of processes from simulationists who numerically 
experiment with those models as well as notice that the boundaries between these roles tend to 
blur in practice, one can try to draw a schematic representation of the roles involved in the 
production of simulation results (Figure 1). In simulation, having acquired all necessary models 
(codes, lattices, and input decks), an advanced IT user can start experimenting with them producing 
first new results. I define here an IT expert as one whose computer literacy is sufficient to engage 
with computer systems – codes, programming languages, and operating systems; that is usually 
comprehensible by an experienced practitioner from a technical professional field who for a 
particular reason demands to turn to simulations; that can be someone, for instance, without a 
background in meteorology simulating a thunderstorm, or a background in particle interactions 
attempting to simulate particle propagation in matter. 
However, there is a long way between applying ready sets of procedures and a competent 
experimenting with models – simulation – because one needs to understand what kind of process 
models exerts which effect on output in the course of simulations. Such an understanding is crucial 
for simulationists in order to be able to adequately interpret outputs. That is why on the way from 
an IT user to an experienced simulationist a practitioner needs to communicate with modelers. 
Modelers provide them models of elementary processes with access to a limited parameter space 
of variables not implying knowledge of models’ internal mathematical structures. They also can 
create and provide beginner simulationists example decks (sets of model parameters for process 
models used) and lattices (structural object models) representing solutions of simple problems, 
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which serves them as an aid in learning how to understand and use models. An actual practitioner 
(see Figure 1) can be represented by a simulationist A instructed by a modeler B and an IT expert 
C, all the three being roles. B provides A “low-level” process models (usually in the form of 
procedures) and instructions how to use them, and C provides A supplementary computer codes 
(scripts) and instructions how to employ them. 
Another path in Figure 1, that from an IT user to a process modeler usually lies through 
more specialized education and communication with modelers. Structure modeling skills require 
design thinking and geometric imagination as discussed above and can be acquired through 
practice as well as a more formal education. On the other hand, process modelers in order to 
develop their procedures are usually required certain IT skills. In the course of their everyday’s 
practice they often reconcile low-level process model construction with applying those models to 
construction of composite simulations of higher-level “real-world” systems. In order to accomplish 
that certain IT expertise is also demanded. Thus, an actual low-level process modeler is often also 
a “higher-level” simulationist whereas a simulationist even starting as a pure ideal type usually 
acquires certain interactional expertise (Collins, 2010) in understanding of low-level models 
through communication with process modelers. Nevertheless, even concurrent and alternate 
practicing “low-level” modeling and “higher-level” simulation roles does not entail their epistemic 
entanglement and therefore keeping in mind that distinction is essential for differentiation between 
verification and validation. 
 
Verification and its relation to modeling 
Verification (code verification) is usually understood as either code verification, i.e. search for and 
fixing mistakes in a computer code or solution verification (estimating solution errors and accuracy 
of the code input and output. AIAA standard (AIAA, 1998) defines verification as “the process of 
determining that a model implementation accurately represents the developer’s conceptual 
description of the model and the solution to the model”. What is actually verified according to that 
definition is that an already constructed model is correctly implemented in the code (accurately 
solved) as the code is a computational representation of such a model (its conceptual description). 
Due to the discussed above applicability of inference to low-level elementary process models, in 
most cases analytical checks of both the algorithm implementation and the solution are available.  
Requirement of inference turns out to be in agreement with a practitioner’s statement that 
“verification deals with mathematics” (Oberkampf, 2004). Even in the cases when elementary 
process theories are semi-phenomenological and are based on empirical data, those data are 
acquired and low-level process model adjustments are performed in separate and independent 
studies, outside the context and scope of a particular high-level simulation under scrutiny. 
Availability of such analytical checks and the inference strategy supports association of 
verification with modeling in the sense discussed in this work. Referring to an example discussed 
above, solutions of Maxwellian electrodynamics equations can step by step be matched with 
outputs of the computational procedure and thus its implementation verified. Therefore, I suggest 
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that the conventional verification is applicable to the “low-level” elementary process model 
building defined as modeling in this work. 
 
Validation and its connections to simulation 
 
Rather than verification, validation is defined by AIAA as “the process of determining the degree 
to which a model is an accurate representation of the real world from the perspective of the 
intended uses of the model.” (AIAA, 1998) Such a description implies that the reference is a “real-
world” object and analytical solution is not generally available because the system under scrutiny 
belongs to the higher level of system organization (accelerator or thunderstorm). One more 
important feature of validation is its relation to experimental data. For such system as accelerator, 
simulation outputs are matched with empirical results for the target system itself or its smaller 
copy (prototype). In the latter case experimenting with such a copy with the aim to obtain data for 
simulation code validation is called validation experiment. A definition of physics as an 
experimental science (i.e. heavily relying on empirical data) allows to understand practitioners’ 
statement that “validation deals with physics” (Oberkampf, 2004). Simulation defined in this work 
as numerical experimentation with composite models of “real-world” objects involving 
experimentation with parameters of the computational code and other strategies common with 
experimentation (as discussed above) has certain connections with validation.  
Referring to an example discussed in previous paragraphs, in order to simulate heat release in a 
composite object irradiated by various particles, one needs to validate the simulation code versus 
data obtained in measurements of heat release in simple objects made of pure materials using 
certain particles with well-defined energies and distributions (validation experiments). Low-level 
elementary process models in the form of pre-built procedures invoked by the higher-level 
simulation code are not tested at the simulation stage (including validation), belong to a different 
epistemic scope, and are not altered at that stage. Its relation to the higher-level objects, reliance 
on experimental data as well as applicability of experimental strategies allows us to associate 
simulation as defined in this work with validation. Such a correlation implies that higher-level 
simulation codes are validated rather than verified in the conventional sense. This does not exclude 
searches and fixes of algorithmic errors, however, unavailability of analytic solutions and 
inferences makes them insufficient in absence of experimental strategies. 
Role of calibration 
Calibration or “the process of adjusting numerical or physical modeling parameters in the 
computational model for the purpose of improving agreement with real-world data” (AIAA, 1998) 
is one of experimental strategies of exceptional importance in simulations requires particular 
attention given the definitions of simulation and modeling proposed in this work. In simulation as 
well as conventional experimentation Franklin’s description of calibration as is also applicable: “a 
legitimate and important factor, [which] may even be decisive, in determining the validity of an 
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experimental result” [Franklin, 1994]. From practitioners’ viewpoint, it is employed when 
“validation is not feasible or practical,” (Oberkampf, 2004) and purports adjusting computational 
model parameters so that its outputs matched empirical data for a well-understood (or standard) 
case (a validation experiment can serve an example). An agreement of model outputs with the 
standard case suggests that the use of that model in a novel context may also be conceivable. 
Bearing on the distinction in system organization levels and epistemic scopes discussed here, one 
has to clearly differentiate simulation (higher-level) model parameters, which are subject to 
alterations in the course of calibration, and elementary process (low-level) ones, which are not. 
Oversight of this rule in certain cases can entail entanglement discussed below. 
 
Entanglement arguments 
A number of arguments has been arisen that support the viewpoint that verification and validation 
are entangled. For instance, (Jebeile, 2012) argues that verification and validation are “two phases 
[that] cannot be performed distinctively” and thus are entangled. One of examples that can 
illuminate such an entanglement can be considered examined by (Lenhard, 2007) implementation 
of the “Arakawa operator” (this example was shortly discussed above). (Jebeile, 2012; Lenhard, 
2007) point out to a possibility of introducing distortions in the system behavior through so-called 
discretization schemes2, when differential equations of a mathematical model are converted to 
difference (algebraic) ones with the aim of a more convenient programming of a computer code. 
Given the distinction discussed in this work, a plausible approach to alleviate harm of the 
discretization and similar errors is to separate construction of such discretization schemes (low-
level epistemic scope of modeling) from application of such schemes for simulation of higher-
level models. I do not assert that it is always practically feasible, and concede that in certain 
practical cases such and entanglement can take place, however, I maintain that when scopes and 
strategies are separable and distinct, verification and validation can be differentiated. Distinction 
of scopes allows to prevent “model success due to piecemeal adjustment” (Winsberg, 2010), which 
causes the entanglement or the Duhem problem for verification and validation.  
Another part of the entanglement argument is that “computer simulations are not open to direct 
inspection” (J.Jebeile, 2012) or epistemic opacity (Humphreys, 2004) of simulation. I suggest that 
elementary process models, their computer implementation, and code verification are open to 
direct inspection by modelers (theorists); also in the majority of practically relevant cases methods 
exist to estimate numerical solution error at this stage. On the other hand, I concur that simulation 
is epistemically opaque, but is a numerical-experimental practice (different epistemic scope), and 
proceeds through Franklin’s epistemic strategies of experimentation as discussed above, and thus 
do not need to be open but rather properly calibrated comparably to an experimental apparatus. 
Therefore, epistemic opacity claim is not relevant for modeling as defined in this work and, 
                                                          




although true for simulation, does not bring about a verification and validation entanglement with 
necessity in general. 
Conclusion 
In this paper argue that verification and validation entanglement is not indispensable and although 
can arise in certain practically relevant cases is not true as a generalization. To justify that I assert 
that a distinction between modeling (defined here as construction of low-level mathematical 
computer models of elementary processes) and simulation (construction of higher-level models of 
composite objects and processes assisted by numerical experimenting with them) needs to be 
recognized. Those are different in epistemic scope, the former being theorizing involving inference 
and relying on analytical solutions, and the latter being numerical experimentation based on 
Franklin’s epistemic strategies. I contend that such a distinction whenever practically feasible can 
alleviate implications of the Duhem problem for verification and validation. I show that although 
epistemically distinct, in practice modeling and simulation constitute roles and ideal types and can 
be performed by the same practitioners and, therefore, if not acknowledged by them as roles can 
call for a “role entanglement”. I suggest that for this distinction to hold and to mitigate the 
verification and validation entanglement as well as the “piecemeal adjustment” of models 
undermining their reliability, low-level elementary process models undergone verification must 
not be altered afterwards in the course of higher-level validation simulations. 
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